On September 11, 2001, the world witnessed one of the most devastating terrorist attacks in history. Nearly 3,000 innocent lives were taken, and the shockwaves from that day rippled across the globe, igniting a new chapter in global security and military policy.
The immediate response from the U.S. government was swift: a military invasion of Afghanistan to dismantle the Taliban regime that had harbored Al-Qaeda, the group responsible for the attacks.
The early military campaign succeeded in removing the Taliban from power and crippling al-Qaeda’s network. However, this initial success was short-lived.
The U.S. military soon found itself entangled in a much more complex and protracted conflict—one that went beyond conventional warfare.
The strategy shifted toward counter-insurgency, or COIN, a doctrine designed to not only eliminate enemy combatants but also stabilize regions by addressing the political, economic, and social causes of insurgency.
However, this strategy had a significant flaw. While the military is adept at combat, it is not well-equipped to handle the political, economic, and civic actions that are essential for counter-insurgency.
The core mission of the military is centered on defense and combat, not governance. As a result, efforts to rebuild Afghanistan’s institutions and create lasting peace faltered.
The absence of effective governance and community engagement allowed extremist ideologies to take root, turning Afghanistan into a breeding ground for further radicalisation.
Worse, the U.S. efforts to fund various campaigns and civil projects in Afghanistan were systematically subverted by corrupt elements within the Afghan government.
Billions of dollars intended to build roads, schools, and public services were siphoned off by warlords, political elites, and criminal networks.
Instead of stabilizing the region, this corruption enriched the most vile predators in Afghan society, fueling resentment among the population.
These corrupt practices became a major factor in the failure to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. Over time, the rampant corruption drove public opinion against the U.S.-backed government and fueled massive public support for the return of the Taliban.
The population, disillusioned by empty promises and government greed, began to view the Taliban as the only viable alternative, despite their extremist ideology.
In this vacuum of effective governance, ISIS, one of the most dangerous and violent extremist groups of the modern era, began to flourish.
The U.S. military’s inability to address the political and social needs of Afghan society, compounded by the corruption that hollowed out civil efforts, contributed to the rise of this new, global terror network.
It was a stark reminder that defeating terrorism cannot be achieved through military force alone.
The lessons from 9/11 and the war in Afghanistan are clear: the military can dismantle regimes and destroy enemy combatants, but it cannot build nations or heal societies.
Counter-insurgency requires more than just firepower; it demands a coordinated effort that includes political reforms, economic development, and social integration.
The fight against terrorism must be a multi-faceted approach—one that addresses not only the symptoms of extremism but also its root causes.
As we reflect on the 9/11 attacks, we must remember that military force is only part of the solution. True victory in the fight against terrorism requires a commitment to building stable, inclusive, and just societies where extremism cannot thrive.
The failure to address corruption and governance in Afghanistan has proven that without a comprehensive approach, extremism will always find fertile ground to grow.
I speak about this in great detail, on the 23rd anniversary of the attacks in my YouTube channel listed below: https://youtu.be/8Ptm69H3dKk